We introduce threshold uncertainty,à la Nitzan and Romano (1990) , into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are established. Further restricting the threshold uncertainty to a uniform distribution, we show the equilibrium strategies are very simple, even allowing for any number of players with asymmetric distributions of values. Comparative statics with respect to changes in players' distributions are derived, allowing changes in both the intensity and the dispersion of values. For example, increased uncertainty, in the sense of mean-preserving spreads of players' distributions of values, increases equilibrium contributions. Finally, we show the equilibrium is interim incentive inefficient. The sharpness of our results greatly contrasts with the more qualified insights of earlier private-values models with known cost threshold, which relied on there being two symmetric players and generally exhibited multiple equilibria.
1
Our paper belongs to the strand of the literature that assumes either such a mediator does not exist, or, if one does, then it has no commitment power. Focusing in particular on the known-threshold subscription game with private values and continuous contribution strategies, this literature includes Alboth et al. (2001) , Menezes et al. (2001) , Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , and Barbieri and Malueg (2008) , along with Martimort and Moreira (2007) . While these papers provide interesting insights, technical issues, especially for equilibria in which the good is provided with positive probability, have limited the scope of their analysis in important ways:
1. Existence and characterization results are limited to the case of two players having independently and identically distributed values.
2. Description of equilibria often requires further assumptions about specific functional forms for the distribution of players' values.
1 They provide examples including health, environment, global warming, terrorism, multilateral foreign aid, and lobbying.
3. A pervasive non-uniqueness of equilibria hinders comparative statics analysis and muddles efficiency considerations.
The main difference between our model and the previous literature is that we do not consider a fixed threshold. Rather, we assume players are unsure about the exact cost of provision. Uncertainty in the threshold cost appears in Nitzan and Romano (1990) and McBride (2006) . Both papers, in contrast to ours, assume players' values are common knowledge. We find that, beyond being more realistic for many actual economic situations as Nitzan and Romano (1990) argue, a theoretical upshot of the threshold uncertainty assumption turns out to be a large gain in the tractability of the subscription game equilibria.
Our first contribution is to overcome the three limitations in the literature outlined above. For the two-player case, we derive existence, uniqueness, and characterization of equilibria only assuming standard restrictions on the form of the threshold uncertainty, while allowing for asymmetry in players' values. For a uniformly distributed threshold, these results extend to any number of contributors. In addition, our characterization is very simple and equilibrium is tractable. One of the most interesting results of Nitzan and Romano (1990) is that threshold uncertainty qualitatively alters the properties of full-information subscription game equilibria, especially with regards to efficiency: while fully-efficient equilibria exist when the threshold is fixed, efficiency is generally not attainable with a stochastic threshold. Our first contribution shows that, for private-value environments, this qualitative difference is larger in scope: beyond leading to different efficiency results, threshold uncertainty allows a sharp analysis of problems, like asymmetry in players' values, that are hard to tackle when the threshold cost is fixed.
Our second contribution is more applied. Tractability and uniqueness of equilibrium make our environment useful for understanding design features of the subscription game. For example, it has been suggested that, compared to binary contribution possibilities (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984 , for example), allowing for continuous contribution choices may yield greater contributions, and hence greater likelihood of provision.
We develop an example showing that the equilibrium with continuous strategies yields contributions at least as large as when contributors are restricted to contribute either 0 or b, say; but for a carefully chosen value of b, the discrete-contribution model has the same expected contributions and probability of provision.
We then show how changes in both intensity and dispersion of one player's values affect the contribution behavior of all other players and we determine the overall effect on total contributions. First, we show that if a player's values increase, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, then that player's contributions increase and the others' decrease-but overall expected contributions increase and so, too, does the probability of provision. Second, when only one player's distribution of values becomes more dispersed in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, we establish not only that total contributions increase, but that the increase is entirely due to the player in question contributing more, while everyone else contributes less. Correspondingly, the payoff of the "more uncertain" player decreases, while the payoff of every other player increases. We relate these results to the empirical literature on lobbying surveyed in Potters and Sloof (1996) and to the papers analyzing advantages and disadvantages of heterogeneity and fragmentation in cooperative endeavors, a literature surveyed in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) . Moreover, our results complement McBride's (2006) . While McBride (2006) focuses on the effects of changing the distribution of the threshold cost, we focus on the effects of changing the distributions of players' values. One of McBride's most interesting results is that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the threshold may increase equilibrium contributions, 2 thus contradicting the usual intuition that inefficiency worsens as the uncertainty increases. Again, in our private-information setting, the results are sharper and richer: a mean-preserving spread of any agent's distribution of value will increase total equilibrium contributions, and, under symmetry, interim expected welfare unequivocally improves.
Our third and final contribution is to examine the efficiency properties of equilibrium in relation to the extant results for the subscription game with known threshold. No difference arises as far as classical efficiency, that is, when the planner faces no incentive problems in eliciting private information from individuals. Menezes et al. (2001) show classical inefficiency of the subscription game with known threshold and we quickly confirm this conclusion for an uncertain threshold. However, interim incentive efficiency of the subscription game with known threshold is possible. This more permissive definition of efficiency recognizes that any alternative allocation the planner may propose must provide incentives for individuals to truthfully report their private information and to voluntarily participate. 3 In particular, Laussel and Palfrey (2003) show the subscription game may be interim incentive efficient, although they establish this only for a uniform distribution of values and for a range of cost parameters. Moreover, inefficient equilibria always exist. Martimort and Moreira (2007) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, presents a general existence result, and proves uniqueness of equilibrium for the two-player case. Section 3 considers the case of a uniformly distributed threshold and characterizes the unique equilibrium for any number of players. Com-parative statics with respect to changes in players' values are also derived. Section 4 analyzes the efficiency properties of equilibrium, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The subscription game with threshold uncertainty
We consider the problem of n players who simultaneously contribute any positive amount to the funding of a binary public good. Player i's value for the good is v i , i = 1, ..., n. Players' values v i are independently distributed random variables with cumulative distribution functions (cdf) F i , which have supports
where 0 ≤ v i <v i < ∞, i = 1, ..., n. A player's realized value is known only to that player. We suppose F i is continuous with density function f i . The cost of the public good is c, distributed with continuous cdf H having density h with support [c,c] , where 0 ≤ c < v i ≤c (without index, the summation is over the entire player set i = 1, . . . , n). The foregoing description is common knowledge
In the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991) , we consider the subscription game: players' contributions are refunded if they are insufficient to cover c. If the good is provided, then the payoff to player i is
If the good is not provided, then the payoff to player i is 0. Therefore, the expected utility of agent i with value v i contributing x is
where s j denotes agent j's strategy, for j = 1, ..., n. For any vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) we denote by v −i the vector (v 1 , . . . , v i−1 , v i+1 , . . . , v n ) and denote by F −i the distribution of v −i . We similarly define v −i and v −i . Now U i in (1) can be expressed as
Corollary 2.1 in Athey (2001) yields the following existence result.
Proposition 1 (Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in increasing strategies). Suppose the densities f i , i = 1, . . . , n, are bounded. Then for any continuous distribution of the cost H, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in increasing strategies.
The proof of Proposition 1, a verification of the conditions of Athey's corollary, is given in the Appendix.
Moreover, if c <v i for at least some i, then the equilibrium probability of completion is strictly positive.
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4 If the probability of completion is zero, then all types receive zero payoff. The following is then a profitable deviation for types sufficiently close tov i : contribute (v i + c)/2 (see equation (2)).
We next provide conditions under which the equilibrium in the subscription game is unique. To do this we assume c = 0. This assumption implies that any contribution larger thanv i is strictly dominated by a contribution ofv i , so without loss of generality we restrict attention to contributions in [0,v i ] for any player i. Now, if the threshold distribution H is concave, then U i in (2) is strictly quasi-concave in x, because of the assumptionc ≥ v i (see below). Standard results then imply uniqueness of the optimal contribution for each type, given any profile of contributions for the other players. In particular, the derivative of U i with respect to x is
where r i is defined as the ratio
Note that r i is well-defined because the strict dominance argument above implies the denominator is nonzero. Moreover, when H is concave, r i is strictly increasing in x, so by (3) U i is indeed quasiconcave in x.
The first-order conditions imply that if x * is the best response of agent i with type v i , then x * must solve the following equation in x,
The determination of the unique optimal (positive) contribution level, using equation (5), is depicted in Figure 1 .
Beyond providing a graphical proof of the uniqueness of each type's best-response contribution level, Figure 1 also shows why once a player's contribution is positive, it is strictly increasing for all larger values:
because increases in value simply shift upward the v i − r i curve, the intersection with the 45
• line occurs at a larger contribution level.
Before proceeding, we note that equilibrium strategies are almost everywhere differentiable, and it is convenient to establish the following fact. For any v i at which the equilibrium contribution function s i is strictly positive and differentiable, the derivative does not exceed 1 2 . To see this last point, note that • line 
from which the desired result follows immediately. Therefore, the equilibrium contribution
This result in itself is sufficient to establish that the subscription game is classically inefficient.
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We next establish that, when there are two players, equilibrium in the subscription game is unique. This uniqueness stands in contrast to the subscription game with fixed threshold, where a continuum of equilibria is the norm.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of equilibrium). Suppose H is a concave distribution with support [0,c] . Furthermore, assumec ≥v 1 +v 2 + max{v 1 , v 2 }. Then the two-player subscription game with threshold uncertainty has a unique equilibrium.
5 Classical efficiency requires the good to be provided if and only if P v i ≥ c. Because c < Pv i ≤c, the good should be provided with positive probability. As just shown, players contribute strictly less than their values, so with positive probability their total contributions will fall short of c while their values sum to more than c.
Proof. With H concave, condition (5) must hold, so any equilibrium (s 1 , s 2 ) must satisfy
and
Equation (6) implicitly defines the operator T 1 (s 2 ), where the value of T 1 (s 2 )(v 1 ) is given by the solution for x * of (5). Similarly, (7) defines an operator T 2 (s 1 ), with T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) also determined via (5). Therefore, Lemma 1 (Monotonicity).
Condition (9) follows because the ratios r i , defined in (4) and used in defining O 1 , are strictly increasing in each argument, due to the concavity of H. Therefore, each operator T i is decreasing in its function argument, so that O 1 , the application of T 1 to T 2 (s 1 ), is decreasing in T 2 (s 1 ); and ultimately O 1 is increasing in its functional argument. The formal verification of this argument appears in the proof of Lemma 1, which is in the Appendix. Then, we show the following version of "discounting."
Lemma 2 (Discounting).
and then
Condition (11) remains to consider the case of T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) > 0, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: Intermediate step in establishing that the operator O i exhibits "discounting"
Observe from (4) that r 2 (x,s 1 + d) = r 2 (x + d,s 1 ), so that the curve labelled v 2 − r 2 (x,s 1 + d) is simply a leftward translation of the original curve, labelled v 2 − r 2 (x,s 1 ), by the amount d. Because these curves are downward-sloping, it follows, as shown in Figure 2 , that
, which is (11).
Equation (12) is demonstrated along similar lines. The proof of Lemma 2 formally establishes (11) and (12), and thereby (10), in the Appendix.
Following Blackwell (1965) we now have, for the two distinct equilibrium strategies s 1 ands 1 ,
where the first inequality follows from monotonicity and the second from discounting; similarly,
Combining these results yields (8). Because s 1 =s 1 , then
this contradiction shows it must be that s 1 =s 1 . A similar proof establishes that it cannot be that s 2 =s 2 .
Therefore, there cannot exist two distinct equilibria. Hence, the equilibrium, whose existence is assured by Proposition 1, must be unique.
As a technical remark, it is worth noting that the stronger assumptionc ≥v 1 +v 2 + max{v 1 , v 2 } in Proposition 2, rather thanc ≥v 1 +v 2 as in the earlier part of this section, is only for ease of exposition.
It ensures that the denominator of r i in (4) remains non-zero even when, in the course of the proof, the distance d is added to an equilibrium strategy. Proposition 2 can be proved under the weaker assumption thatc ≥v 1 +v 2 by expanding, as follows, the definition of the ratio r i in (4) when the denominator is zero: set r i tov i . At the cost of more cumbersome notation, all steps in the proof go through essentially unchanged.
A uniformly distributed threshold
In this section we assume the threshold cost is uniformly distributed on [0,c] . With this assumption, the subscription game with an uncertain threshold becomes simpler to analyze, and several interesting results follow. Given H(c) = c/c, in (2) the probability that the good is provided is E H(
, so the utility of agent i, (2), becomes
where
.., n; that is, K j is the expected contribution of agent j. The comparison of equations (2) and (13) immediately reveals the simplification that the uniform distribution assumption yields.
Without it, in general, an agent needs to forecast the whole distribution of all of his rivals' contributions (see (2)). With a uniformly distributed threshold, an agent needs to forecast only the expected value of his rivals' contributions (see (13)).
We now characterize equilibria. Since U i in (13) is strictly concave in x, the first-derivative
, along with the non-negativity constraint on x, yields the following "best-response" function for player i,
Therefore, using the definition of K i above and (14), in equilibrium the following system of equations must be satisfied by (K 1 , ..., K n ):
For general concave threshold distributions with support [0,c], Proposition 2 established uniqueness of equilibrium only for the case of two contributors. Additionally requiring this distribution to be uniform, we next establish uniqueness of equilibrium for any number of players. The following lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix, demonstrates that there exists at most one solution to the system of equations in (15).
Lemma 3 (Uniqueness). There exists at most one solution (K * 1 , ..., K * n ) to the system of equations (15).
Collecting the results of our previous analysis, we obtain the following.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness and Characterization of Equilibrium). In the subscription game with threshold uncertainty, there exists a unique equilibrium; the equilibrium strategy,
given in (14) and (K * 1 , ..., K * n ) denotes the unique solution of (15). The ex ante equilibrium probability that the good is provided equals
Proof. Proposition 1 guarantees at least one equilibrium exists. The analysis above shows any equilibrium must have strategies given by (14), for some set of numbers K 1 , . . . , K n . The system (14) implies (15), and Lemma 3 implies that there is a unique solution to (15). Therefore, there is a unique profile of equilibrium strategies.
Because c is uniformly distributed on [0,c], for any given vector of values v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), the probability
The following two-player examples illustrate equilibrium in the subscription game with threshold uncertainty.
Example 1 (Values are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1).
Consider two players whose values are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then both players use the same strategy and (15) reduces to
the solution to which is K * = 3 − 2 √ 2 ≈ 0.17157. Therefore, the corresponding symmetric equilibrium strategy is
Ex post efficiency would require that the public good be provided if and only if v 1 + v 2 ≥ c. If, further, c is uniformly distributed over [0, 2] and all random variables are independent, then the good would efficiently be provided with probability 0.5. However, by Proposition 3 the subscription-game equilibrium provides the good only with probability 2K * /c = 3 − 2 √ 2 ≈ 0.17157, or in about 34% of the cases where it should be provided.
As Example 1 clearly illustrates-in sharp contrast with the known-threshold case 7 -equilibrium is unique and tractable, thus making our environment useful for understanding design features of the subscription game. For instance, it has sometimes been suggested that allowing players to make contributions of any amount, rather than simply one of a preselected set, can increase overall contributions and thereby the likelihood of provision. Cadsby and Maynes (1999) provide an experiment testing allowing continuous or "all-or-nothing" contribution possibilities and find that the continuous case yielded greater contributions.
Their finding that one particular specification of discrete contribution levels yields less than the continuous possibilities case is interesting but hardly conclusive-perhaps other specifications of the binary possibilities could do better. Our framework is ideal for formulating this comparison. We do this next.
Example 2 (The probability of provision: binary or continuous contribution possibilities).
We again suppose there are two players, values are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and cost is uniformly distributed over [0,c] , wherec ≥ 2. From Proposition 3 and Example 1 we know that each player's expected contribution in the continuous-contribution case is
Next suppose that players' contributions are restricted to be either 0 or b (we may assume b ≤ 1).
Equilibrium has players use a strategy given by
for some critical value v * that depends on b. Player 1 with value v contributing 0 earns payoff
if instead player 1 contributes b, his payoff is
The threshold value v * denotes the type indifferent between contributing 0 and contributing b; solving
This expected contribution is strictly quasiconcave in b, reaching its maximum at b * = √ 2 − 1; the resulting expected contribution of each player is
which is precisely the same expected contribution as in the continuous-case model. Thus, the probability of provision in the two settings is also identical. Note, though, for any choice of b other than b * , the binary-contribution model yields strictly lower contributions.
The next example shows our framework may be used to study how the equilibrium of the subscription game varies as the distributions of players' values change.
Example 3 (Stochastic dominance comparative statics).
In this example players 1 and 2 are not symmetric. As in Example 1, we continue to assume that the distribution of player 2's value, F 2 , is uniform over [0, 1] , but for player 1 we deviate from Example 1 in two natural ways: we consider distributions that are related to the uniform distribution by either first-order or second-order stochastic dominance. We continue to assume the support of player 1's value is [0, 1], but in the first instance it has cdfF 1 (v) = 1 − (1 − v) 2 and in the second it has cdfF 1 (v) = 3v 2 − 2v 3 . Letting F 1 denote the uniform distribution over [0, 1] in Example 1, it is readily verified that F 1 first-order stochastically dominatesF 1 andF 1 second-order stochastically dominates F 1 . Figure 3 depicts these cdfs. 
0.08195 0.21070 0.29265
0.16533 0.17417 0.33950 Table 1 shows the resulting expected efforts of the two players for the respective pairs of distributions.
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Consider first the effect of moving from the pair (F 1 , F 2 ) to (F 1 , F 2 ), according to which player 1's values are reduced in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. We see that player 1's expected contribution falls and player 2's increases. Indeed, the change from F 1 toF 1 results in a weak reduction in player 1's contribution strategy and a weak increase in player 2's. 9 This effect is very intuitive. When player 1's distribution of values is shifted leftward, player 2 recognizes that, even if player 1 were not to change his contribution strategy, player 1's expected contribution would fall, and this induces player 2 to increase his contributions. This induced increase in player 2's contributions then actually induces player 1 to reduce his contribution strategy, reinforcing player 2's need to increase his own contribution. In the new equilibrium, player 1's contribution strategy has decreased and player 2's has increased.
Next consider the effect of moving from the pair (F 1 , F 2 ) to (F 1 , F 2 ), according to which player 1's values become less dispersed around the mean (F 1 is a mean-preserving spread ofF 1 ). Again we see the change from F 1 toF 1 results in a weak reduction in player 1's contribution strategy and a weak increase in player 2's.
Here, too, even if player 1 were not to change his equilibrium contribution strategy, his expected contribution would fall because his strategy is a convex function of his value andF 1 second-order stochastically dominates F 1 . Given this reduction in player 1's expected contribution, player 2 is induced to increase his contributions, and this in turn induces player 1 to reduce his own contribution strategy. The net result is that player 1's strategy is weakly reduced and player 2's is weakly increased.
The relationships among contribution strategies in Example 3 hold in general, as we will show. It is convenient to establish first, however, a general result on the crowding out by exogenous contributions to the public good. 
Crowding out
Let K E denote the level of contributions that are exogenously provided by an external authority, and consider how players' contributions change as K E increases. Replicating the steps leading to Proposition 3, we obtain that, in equilibrium, the system of equations (15) becomes
The application of the implicit function theorem to (16) leads to the following proposition (the proof is in the Appendix).
Beyond establishing, in part b, that crowding out is only partial in our model, Proposition 4 allows an interesting graphical analysis of the equilibrium system of equations (15), even when the number of players is larger than 2. It is indeed possible to separate out player 1 from the aggregate of all other players, and represent expected contributions on a Cartesian plane. Letting (14) and (15), we define the following (expected-contribution) reaction function for player 1,
for given K −1 . Observe that the function R 1 is continuous, convex, and strictly decreasing, with slope less than 1/2 in absolute value. Similarly, we can consider all equations in (14) and (15), except the one for player 1, as defining a reaction function for all other players, given some exogenously fixed level for K 1 .
The sum of all solutions K 2 , ..., K n then can be written as R −1 (K 1 ) and, in equilibrium
By Proposition 4, with K 1 assuming the role of K E , we also see R −1 is strictly decreasing, with slope less than (n − 1)/n < 1 in absolute value. The unique equilibrium occurs at the intersection of R 1 and R −1 , as Figure 4 illustrates. This figure is useful in the analysis of perturbations of the distribution of values, which we undertake next.
• Figure 4 : Illustration of equilibrium
The following lemma, used repeatedly in the next section, shows how, cet. par., a shift in a player's distribution of values shifts that player's reaction function.
Lemma 4. Fix the distributions F 2 , ..., F n . Consider two distributions for agent 1's values, F 1 andF 1 .
If either F 1 first-order stochastically dominatesF 1 orF 1 second-order stochastically dominates F 1 , then 
where the inequality follows because, for any fixed K −1 , max {0, v 1 − K −1 } is an increasing convex function of v 1 and we assumed that either F 1 first-order stochastically dominatesF 1 orF 1 second-order stochastically dominates F 1 .
With particular reference to second-order stochastic dominance, the previous lemma states that the larger the dispersion around the mean of one agent's values, the larger his expected contribution, fixing all other agents' behavior. The non-negativity constraint on contributions, which is more likely to bind for small values because the equilibrium is increasing, plays a crucial role in the intuitive explanation of the result. This exogenous floor implies that, in terms of expected contributions, a change in the right tail of the distribution of values dominates an opposite and identically-sized change at the left tail of the distribution. This is because changes in contribution behavior for very high values are unconstrained, while changes in contribution behavior for very low values are constrained by the fact that actual contributions must remain non-negative.
Stochastic dominance
We first consider distributions F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n for players' values, and denote the unique expected equilibrium contributions from (15) , F 2 , ..., F n ) than when they are (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ).
Proof. Let R 1 (K −1 | F 1 ) and R 1 (K −1 |F 1 ) be as in Lemma 4. To establish part a, observe by Lemma 4 that changing player 1's distribution from F 1 toF 1 (weakly) shifts player 1's reaction function leftward, as shown in Figure 5 . Therefore, the equilibrium values of the expected contributions (K 1 , K −1 ) for the profile (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ) will be on the function R −1 , to the northwest of the equilibrium expected contributions for the profile (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ). This reasoning establishesK * 1 ≤ K * 1 in part a, and it is illustrated in Figure 5 .
The remainder of part a follows from Proposition 4.
To establish part b, it is enough to consider Figure 5 again, remembering that the function R −1 is strictly decreasing with slope less than 1 in absolute value (see Proposition 4). Therefore, the point (K * 1 ,K * −1 ) lies below the line that connects all pairs (K 1 , K −1 ) summing to K *
To establish part c, denote the equilibrium strategies as s * i when the distributions are (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ), and asŝ * i when the distributions are (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ). Such equilibrium strategies are described in Proposition 3,
where the first inequality follows becauseŝ * 1 is optimal againstK * −1 , and the second inequality follows becausê K * −1 ≥ K * −1 and the expression for U 1 is increasing in the expected contribution of the other agents (see (13)). Note that the first term in the chain of inequalities above is the equilibrium payoff for type v 1 under (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ), while the last term in the chain of inequalities is the equilibrium payoff of type v 1 under (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ), so we have established part c. To establish part d, we first note that, for any j ≥ 2, we have
by parts a and b, so that
proceeding as in part c, we obtain
thus establishing the desired inequalities.
Part a of Proposition 5 confirms the intuition in Example 3.
10 Part b proves that, while the expected contributions of the first agent and those of all other agents move in opposite directions, the sign of the effect on overall contributions is determined by the sign of the change for the first agent's contribution. This follows from the imperfect crowding-out result in Proposition 4, which states that all other agents' contributions react in the opposite direction of a change in the expected contribution of agent 1, but not sufficiently to fully offset it. The intuition for part c is simple: when moving from distributions (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ) to (F 1 , F 2 , ..., F n ), all agents other than agent 1 are contributing more. Therefore, agent 1's utility increases. The intutition for part d is similar, once one establishes that any agent j different than 1 perceives that all other agents contribute less, in total.
Proposition 5 predicts changes in players' expected contributions when one player's distribution of values is shifted in the sense of first-order or second-order stochastic dominance. Recalling formula (14) for a player's equilibrium contribution strategy we have the following corollary regarding the actual contribution strategies, showing that the contribution strategy pointwise moves in the same direction as a player's expected contribution.
Corollary 1. Fix the distributions F 2 , ..., F n . Consider two distributions for agent 1's values, F 1 andF 1 .
If either F 1 first-order stochastically dominatesF 1 orF 1 second-order stochastically dominates F 1 , then
Proposition 5 has implications for adding another member to the group of participants. Consider Proposition 5 where according to distributionF 1 player 1 is sure to have value 0 while for distribution F player 1's value has a nondegenerate distribution. When player 1's value is sure to be 0, he is effectively a nonparticipant in the game. Because F 1 first-order stochastically dominatesF 1 , we have the following result.
Corollary 2 (Adding a participant). If a new potential contributor is added to the group, then the expected contribution of each original member falls but total expected contributions increase. Moreover, each original member of the new group, for each possible value, is at least as well off as without the additional member.
The comparisons in Proposition 5 consider changing the distribution of values for only a single player.
For symmetric games, we can also make clear comparisons when the change in the common distribution of values can be described by stochastic dominance.
Corollary 3 (Stochastic dominance in symmetric games). Consider two distributions of players' values, F
andF . All n players' values are independently and identically distributed, in the first case according to cdf F , and in the second according toF . If either F first-order stochastically dominatesF orF second-order stochastically dominates F , then K * ≥K * . Moreover, for each possible value, a player's payoff is at least as large when the common distribution of values is F as when it isF .
The first part of Corollary 3 follows from repeated application of Proposition 5.b. As the profile of players' distributions changes from (F ,F , . . . ,F ) to (F,F , . . . ,F ) to . . . to (F, . . . , F,F ) to (F, . . . , F, F ), total expected contributions weakly increase. Thus, the total expected efforts at the beginning and end of this chain of changes satisfy nK * ≤ nK * . The second part of Corollary 3 follows from (13), where it is clear that for any value v 1 , for example, player 1 is at least as well off when the common distribution of values is F as when it isF because all other players contribute more under F than underF (i.e., (n−1)K * ≥ (n−1)K * ).
A graphical derivation of Corollary 3's contribution ranking is also possible. As explained in the proof of Lemma 4, the change in distributions from F toF (weakly) shifts player 1's reaction function R 1 leftward as depicted in Figure 6 . The unique equilibrium is symmetric and satisfies the two conditions, i) K * = R 1 ((n − 1)K * −1 ) and ii) K * −1 = (n − 1)K * . In Figure 6 the equilibrium is found at the intersection of the reaction function (condition i)) and the symmetry line (condition ii)). For the two different distributions, Figure 6 showsK
It is worth pointing out that results similar to those in Proposition 5 and Corollaries 2 and 3 have not been available for the subscription game with fixed threshold, where technical difficulties make situations Figure 6 : Symmetric equilibria when F FOSDF orF SOSD F with asymmetries or more than two players analytically intractable. In contrast, connections with observed behavior are easier within our model. For example, increasing a player's values by first-order stochastic dominance leads that player, quite naturally, to greater expected contributions. This implication has been corroborated by the empirical literature on lobbying surveyed by Potters and Sloof (1996) .
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As a particular illustration of second-order stochastic dominance in Corollary 3, consider three symmetric distributions on [0, 1] having mean 1/2. The first is a unit mass at 1/2, the second is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and the third is the two-point distribution where 0 and 1/2 each have probability 1/2. These are ordered by second-order stochastic dominance, with the two-point distribution being the most risky and the one-point distribution the least. The expected contribution of each player is 1/6 ≈ 0.16667 for the one-point distribution, 0.17157 for the uniform distribution, and 1/5 = 0.2 for the two-point distribution.
Our results for second-order stochastic dominance may contribute to the literature on the advantages or disadvantages of ethnic fragmentation in games of trust, team production, social capital, or, more generally, in cooperative endeavors. Various authors have shown the effect of increased heterogeneity may be positive or negative. This vast empirical and theoretical literature is well surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) , who identify three ways to formalize how heterogeneity affects economic outcomes: through preferences, through an influence on available strategies, and through the production function. 12 These formalizations are important and insightful. However, none appears to capture a facet of interethnic relations that plays an important role in the sociology literature: ignorance about each other because of lack of social contact.
13
A natural formalization of the fact that agents are more ignorant about members of other ethnic or racial groups than about members of their own group is that agents perceive "outsiders" as more risky, in terms of second-order stochastic dominance. 14 Part b of Proposition 5, for the specific case in which the second-order stochastic dominance ranking applies to a minority of only one agent, yields the surprising result that, in expectation, total contributions are larger in a non-homogenous group rather than in the homogenous group.
Corollary 3 may be used to extend the comparison to the other extreme case where each agent represents a different ethnic group. Intermediate and more realistic comparisons appear more complex to decipher because of the feedback effect generated by how the minority may view the values of the majority, and a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we believe that ignorance may be usefully added to the three-way classification in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) , and its effects can be explored along the lines of Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 and Corollary 3 have important normative implications as well: they point at free-riding as the major sources of inefficient underprovision in our framework, rather than asymmetric information. In fact, total contributions are larger when agents are uncertain about each other's values. Moreover, in the presence of private information a weaker definition of efficiency is appropriate. This issue is explored in the next section.
Interim Incentive Efficiency
The main objective of this section is to determine whether the equilibrium allocation in Proposition 3 is efficient. We maintain the assumption that the threshold cost is uniformly distributed over [0,c] . We first clarify the notion of efficiency we are considering, among the alternatives in the literature for environments with private information. We then apply the existing characterization results to the equilibrium allocation in Section 3, establishing that this allocation is not interim incentive efficient.
The notion of efficiency we use is interim incentive efficiency, defined by Holmström and Myerson (1983) ,
12 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, pp. 764-766) and references therein. 13 The so-called Contact Theory "...holds that the sharp rupture between the social lives of whites and blacks promotes whites' ignorance about blacks. This ignorance feeds erroneous, oversimplified, negative beliefs about blacks, which in turn engender feelings of hostility and discriminatory social and political predispositions toward blacks." See Jackman and Crane (1986, pp. 460-461) and references therein. Negative beliefs, usually interpreted as prejudice, may be formalized as agents' preference to interact with other agents who are similar to themselves, as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) . Beyond prejudice, ignorance plays an important role in Contact Theory, and this is the aspect we focus on.and further characterized by Palfrey (1999 and . This is the same notion used by Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Barbieri and Malueg (2008) for the subscription game with known threshold. Before proceeding further with the welfare analysis, as in many models of threshold provision of a public good, the issue arises of how, for efficiency considerations, to deal with contributions in excess of the threshold.
Here we follow Nitzan and Romano (1991) , Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , and Barbieri and Malueg (2008) in assuming that excess contributions are not wasted, but they accrue to the producer of the public good. We adopt the formalization of Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , who introduce a new agent, the collector, in addition to the n players described in Section 2, whom we refer to as contributors in this section. The collector is the only agent that can produce the public good, incurring cost c. The collector is risk-neutral and is privately informed about c. With this in mind, we can reinterpret our subscription game in Section 2 as a take-it-orleave-it offer that contributors make to the collector. Each contributor commits to paying some amount if the collector provides the public good, and zero otherwise. After seeing the sum of promised payments, and taking into consideration the realization of the cost of production c, the collector decides whether to accept the contributors' offer. If the offer is rejected, the public good is not produced and all players receive zero payoffs. If the contributors' offer is accepted, the public good is produced, the payoff of the collector is the sum of contributors' offers minus c, and the payoff of each contributor i is v i − (player i's contribution), just as in Section 2. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the collector accepts those and only those offers that sum to at least c. Therefore, the contributors' problem is equivalent to the one solved in Sections 2 and 3.
It is now possible to describe an interim incentive efficient equilibrium allocation. We consider each type of the collector and each type of each contributor as separate individuals. The equilibrium allocation deriving from Proposition 3 and from the optimal behavior of the collector described above is interim incentive efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by another allocation resulting from any incentive compatible, and individually rational mechanism. Note how this definition of efficiency takes into account the limitations that private information imposes on the social planner trying to implement alternative allocations. The definition of individually rational we use is what Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) call "standard": the utility of the outside option is constant in type and equal to zero.
Any discussion of interim incentive efficiency requires a discussion of mechanism design. By the Revelation Principle it suffices to consider only direct mechanisms that are feasible, that is, both incentive compatible and individually rational. Direct mechanisms are pairs of functions (p, x) defined on [v,v] 
. Each player i reports value v i and the collector reports c ; then, denoting with v the vector (v 1 , . . . , v n ), x i (v , c ) is player i's payment to the collector and p(v , c ) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability the good is provided. Under mechanism (p, x), when others report truthfully, player i with value v i reporting v i obtains payof
and the collector with cost c reporting c obtains payof
. . , n, and U * c (c) ≡Û c (c|c) as the associated truth-telling payoffs. The Envelope Theorem then implies that, for an incentive compatible mechanism (p, x),
integration of these two formulas gives payoffs under an incentive compatible mechanism:
and, for the collector,
Before we address the interim efficiency of the subscription game equilibrium derived above, we provide a fairly general sufficient condition for inefficiency of a mechanism in this public good environment. The value of this sufficient condition is that it does not require the monotonicity of virtual valuations, whether typeweighted or not, thus covering situations beyond the "regular" case defined in Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) .
It is convenient first to define the sum of virtual valuations S(v, c) as follows:
Proposition 6 (A sufficient condition for inefficiency). Let (p, x) be an incentive compatible, individually rational direct mechanism. Suppose there exists an allocation rulep(v, c) such that the following conditions 15 The virtual valuation for the seller is
are satisfied:
is weakly decreasing in c; and
Then (p, x) is not interim incentive efficient.
Proof. Condition 1 states that the interim probability of completion for each type is at least as large under p as under p, while Condition 2 is the usual second-order condition for incentive compatibility ofp. Condition 3 states that the overall surplus, under incentive compatibility, is larger forp than for p. Because (p, x) is incentive compatible and individually rational, the "only if" implication Lemma 3 in Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) then yields
where the last equality follows from Condition 3. Therefore, the "if" implication of Lemma 3 in Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) , along with Condition 2, imply that, using allocation rulep, an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism exists in which the utility of the lowest type of each player is the same as for p, and in which the utility of the worst type for the seller is strictly higher, in particular it is increased by ε > 0. To conclude the proof, note that Condition 1 and the usual incentive compatibility lemma (Lemma 1 in Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) ) imply each type of the buyer is not hurt by the change in mechanisms, and each type of the seller is strictly better off. 16 This establishes that p is Pareto-dominated byp.
The subscription game is an incentive compatible, individually rational (non-direct) mechanism; for any equilibrium (s 1 , ..., s n ), using the optimal behavior of the collector described above, the equilibrium allocation rule is the following:
We now consider the case of the uniformly distributed threshold, so a unique equilibrium exists and it characterized in Proposition 3. Next, we construct an alternative allocation rule p alt that deviates from p eq where p eq = 0 and S(v, c) > 0. For a subset of this parameter region, we set p alt = 1, being careful that
Condition 2 in Proposition 6 is satisfied. 17 We then apply the previous proposition to obtain the following.
Proposition 7 (Inefficiency). The subscription game with a uniformly distributed uncertain threshold is not interim incentive efficient.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume for any i that s i (v i ) > 0; otherwise, the contributor is always inactive and can be disregarded in the analysis below. Defineĉ
that, in equilibrium, the probability of completion is zero for any c ≥ĉ. At the same time, we have S(v,ĉ) = (n − 1) K i > 0. Moreover, we choose η > 0 sufficiently small that for any c >ĉ − η, if
for all i (this is ensured by taking η < min j s j (v j )). We may also choose η > 0 sufficiently small so thatĉ + η <c and, by continuity of S, for any c ∈ (ĉ − η,ĉ + η) and for any profile of values such that
Observe that if c >ĉ−η, then the good is provided only if all contributions are strictly positive; therefore, on this restricted region (20) becomes the following:
We now construct the alternative provision function p alt (v, c), first defining the function g alt . For c ≤ĉ − η,
. Note these properties of g alt :
i. g alt (c) ≤ g eq (c), for any c ≥ĉ − η, with equality only at c =ĉ − η;
ii. g alt is weakly increasing in c;
These properties are illustrated in Figure 7 , which depicts the functions g eq and g alt (note that the origin depicted assumes a strictly positive value of v i ). We now define p alt as follows:
Figure 7 also depicts the relationship between p eq and p alt (the solid lines bound the regions where values of p eq and p alt are as specified). This paper has picked up where Nitzan and Romano (1990) Our results for the two-player case are encouraging, because uniqueness is preserved when H is concave. However, more work is needed to completely describe the n-player case. One might also consider uniform distributions with support bounded away from 0. Such distributions raise the possibility that for some realizations of a player's value, it is certain the good will not be provided (see Alboth et al., 2001, and Barbieri and Malueg, 2008) , which introduces some multiplicity of equilibria. A second area for research would fully investigate how differences among individuals or groups might hinder or facilitate interactions. Our framework offers a laboratory for studying such effects where interactions with less familiar groups could be modeled through the relative dispersion in perceived values of members of own versus different groups.
Proof of Proposition 1. We verify, in order, that the conditions of Corollary 2.1 in Athey (2001) are satisfied.
First, Athey's measurability condition A1 is satisfied in our framework. She also requires densities of players' values to be atomless and bounded, which we have assumed. Her assumption that a player's expected payoff, conditional on value being in a convex set, exist and be finite is satisfied because the term (2) is bounded and integrable for all nondecreasing functions s j , j = i.
Next, her condition i) requires that we can restrict a player's contributions to a compact interval. Any contribution exceedingc is strictly dominated by a contribution ofc. Therefore, we may restrict each player's choice of x to the interval [0,c], so condition i) is satisfied. Athey's condition ii) requires the integrand
. This is satisfied because we assumed H is continuous.
It only remains to check that Athey's single-crossing condition (SCC) is satisfied by U i (x|v i ) for any choice of nondecreasing strategies for players other than i. Let such nondecreasing strategies (s j ) j =i be given. Athey's SCC is stated as follows:
For the remainder of the proof, suppose x H > x L and v H > v L . From the definition of U i in (2) we have
Because x H > x L , the weak inequality in (25) is satisfied, implying that (22) is satisfied. Finally, to show that (23) is satisfied, it suffices to show that if 
If this is not the case, then
this strict inequality is impossible because x H > x L and probabilities are nonnegative. 21 This contradiction implies x L < v L . We can now further conclude that
This must surely be the case because by (26) we know U i (x L | v L ) ≥ 0; therefore the strict inequality in (27) implies the first term on the right-hand side of (27) must be strictly positive, implying
Rearranging the extremes of (27) and (28) now yields
which establishes the strict inequality in (25).
Proof of Lemma 1. The first step in determining
. This is accomplished using equation (5), that is
as long as all terms on the right-hand side are well-defined for
The discussion preceding the statement of Proposition 2 implies that for any v 1 , 0 ≤s 1 (v 1 ) + d ≤v 1 + v 1 , so that each argument of the function h at the denominator in r 2 is in between 0 andc, because we have assumed c ≥v 1 +v 2 + max {v 1 , v 2 }. Therefore, r 2 on the right-hand side of (31) that T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) is well-defined by the assumption that s 1 is part of an equilibrium. We can now show
. Clearly, the statement is true if T 2 (s 1 + d)(v 2 ) = 0, so by way of contradiction
(by the contradiction hypothesis)
(by definition in (5)) thus obtaining the contradiction T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) < T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ). This concludes the proof of
which we now use to show
and finish the proof of the lemma. Verification that T 1 is well-defined in the previous relation follows as above. Moreover, the previous relation is automatically true when T 1 (T 2 (s 1 ))(v 1 ) = 0. Therefore, by way of contradiction, suppose that for some v 1 we have
We then have
thus obtaining a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the lemma establishing monotonicity.
Proof of Lemma 2. The first step is showing equation (11), that is
can establish all terms involved are well-defined along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, the above statement is true if T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) = 0, so by way of contradiction assume T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) > 0 and T 2 (s 1 +d)(v 2 )+d ≤ T 2 (s 1 )(v 2 ) for some v 2 . We then have
(by definition in (5)) thus implying d ≤ 0, a contradiction. This concludes the proof of
and finish the proof of the lemma. Verification that T 1 is well-defined in the previous relation follows as for Lemma 1. Moreover, the previous relation is automatically true when T 1 (T 2 (s 1 + d))(v 1 ) = 0. Therefore, by way of contradiction, suppose that for some v 1 we have
≤ v 1 − r 1 (T 1 (T 2 (s 1 )), T 2 (s 1 )) (by (33)) ≤ T 1 (T 2 (s 1 )(v 1 ), (by definition in (5)) thus implying d ≤ 0, a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the lemma establishing discounting.
Proof of Lemma 3. Define K N ≡ K i . The strategy of the proof follows the methodology in Cornes and Hartley (2007) . We begin by showing a unique K N is consistent with system (15), that is the collection of "best responses" in (14), or
Notice that K N = 0 cannot solve the system (15), becausev i > 0. In what follows, we use f i (v i ) = 0 for v i < v i or v i >v i . Define now σ i ≡ K i /K N , so (14) and (15)
Therefore, the relationship
implicitly describes i's share of expected equilibrium contributions. Note now that every solution of (15) must solve (35) with σ i = 1. To show that at most one value of K N is consistent with these two requirements,
we prove σ i is strictly decreasing in K N wherever σ i > 0. Differentiating both sides of (35) with respect to K N , we obtain
and, regrouping terms, we have
Now note that K i > 0, by (34), implies K N − K i <v i , so the right-hand side of the previous equation is strictly negative. We therefore conclude that if K i > 0, then σ i is strictly decreasing in K N , as we wanted to show. Moreover, as (34) shows, if K i = 0 (and hence σ i = 0) for some value of K N , K i remains equal to zero for all larger values of K N . Therefore, only one K N is consistent with (35) and σ i = 1: as soon as we find one such value, and we keep increasing K N , non-contributors remain non-contributors and σ i strictly decreases away from 1. Uniqueness of the equilibrium K N is sufficient to establish that at most one solution to the system of equations (15) exists, as at most one value of K i is consistent with each K N . To see this, consider again equation (34) and rewrite it as
The derivative of the right-hand side for K i is (1−F i (K N −K i ))/2, which is always smaller then the derivative of the left-hand side, which is 1. Therefore, at most one value of K i can solve the previous equation.
Proof of Proposition 4. Totally differentiating (16) with respect to K E we obtain 0 = dK i dK E + 1 2
which, for contributors, may be rewritten as
while for non-contributors 
The m × m matrix A may be shown to be non-singular, so the implicit function theorem is applicable. To establish part a, we use Farkas' Lemma: −∆ ≥ 0 if there is no solution y to A T y ≥ 0 with 1 T y < 0. By contradiction, assume such a vector y exists, and consider the first element of A T y:
From 1 T y < 0, we have y 2 + ... + y m < −y 1 , so the expression in (38) is strictly smaller than 2 1 − F 1 ( j =1 K j + K E ) − 1 y 1 .
Because the term in square brackets is always positive, the sign of the previous expression only depends on y 1 . In particular, if y 1 < 0, the chain of inequalities above yields that the term in (38) is strictly negative, a contradiction to A T y ≥ 0. Therefore, we must have y 1 ≥ 0. Repeating this reasoning for all elements of A T y we obtain that all elements of y are non-negative, thus contradicting 1 T y < 0. Farkas' Lemma then implies (−∆) ≥ 0, or that dK i /dK E ≤ 0 for all i; furthermore, at least one inequality must hold strictly since otherwise the right-hand side of (37) would be 0. It only remains to show that dK i /dK E < 0 for all i.
For simplicity, we only consider the case where dK 1 /dK E = 0 and dK 2 /dK E < 0 and show this leads to a contradiction. Then the first element of the product A(−∆) is
which is strictly smaller than the second element,
Therefore, (39) and (40) cannot both equal 1, contradicting (37). This completes the proof of part a.
To establish part b, we sum all equations in (37) and obtain
where the inequality follows from part a and the fact that the terms in square brackets is always larger than (m + 1). Thus, we obtain dK i /dK E > −m/(m + 1) ≥ −n/(n + 1), establishing part b.
